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Rent Seeking
SHANKHA CHAKRABORTY AND ERA DABLA-NORRIS*
This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic perfor-
mance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit
markets and a fixed cost to rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in
it, as it allows them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, the level of
rent seeking and economic performance are determined by the initial distribution
of income and wealth. When individuals also differ in their productivity, not all
wealthy agents become rent seekers, and the social costs of rent seeking are typi-
cally lower. In both cases, multiple equilibria with different levels of rent seeking
and production are possible. [JEL D23, D31, D72, O11]
L
ack of development, stagnant growth, insecure property rights, income inequal-
ity, and widespread rent seeking1 are common features of many economies.
One consequence of such rent seeking is that productive resources are diverted
toward appropriative activities, resulting in a misallocation of resources in the
economy. Rent-seeking activities, such as corruption and tax farming, can reduce
growth by lowering overall incentives and opportunities for production and invest-
ment. Cross-country studies find that countries in which corruption and rent seek-
ing are rampant suffer from lower capital accumulation, productivity, and growth
(Mauro, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1997; and Hall and Jones, 1999). Extensive rent
seeking and insecure property rights are also associated with substantial inequal-
*Shankha Chakraborty is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Oregon; Era Dabla-
Norris is an Economist in the IMF’s Middle Eastern and Central Asia Division. The authors are grateful to
Andrew Feltenstein and Jean-Francois Ruhashyankiko for their valuable comments.
1Rent seeking refers to largely unproductive, expropriating activities that bring positive returns to the
individual but not to society (Krueger, 1974).RENT SEEKING
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ity in income and wealth.2 Olson (1965) argued that corruption and rent seeking
are more likely in unequal societies. Easterly (2002) and Keefer and Knack (2002)
show that the adverse effect of inequality on growth operates through weak insti-
tutions and lax enforcement of property rights.
While the empirical evidence suggests links among rent seeking, poor eco-
nomic performance, and income inequality, the persistence of rent seeking in many
countries begs the question of what drives entry into such activities. In many devel-
oping and transition countries, it is the relatively wealthy who choose rent-seeking
activities—such as the government bureaucracy, the army, and the police—rather
than engaging in productive and entrepreneurial activities. In other words, the rent
seekers are exactly those who might otherwise become the first capitalists.
This paper presents a model that analyzes the relationships among rent-seeking
behavior, wealth distribution, and economic performance when the government
cannot protect property rights. We show how an individual’s initial income (wealth)
drives entry into rent seeking and how the size of the rent-seeking sector affects
the level of distortion in an economy. In the model, participation in rent seeking
is a costly activity. However, rent-seeking institutions provide protection against
expropriation by others. With insecure property rights, the incentive to engage in
rent seeking is relatively stronger for the wealthy, who have more to lose from
expropriation than poorer individuals. In the presence of borrowing constraints
and a fixed cost for entry into rent seeking, the size of the rent-seeking sector 
and corresponding efficiency losses in society depend on the initial distribution
of wealth.
The fixed cost for rent seeking can be viewed as analogous to the purchase of
weapons used for protection and for offense. In this interpretation, arms enable
agents to protect their wealth from expropriation by others but also to extract rents
from other agents. Hence, when property rights protection is poor or ineffective,
as is the case in many developing and transition countries, the rich have an incen-
tive to buy arms (i.e., enter into rent-seeking activities such as the government
bureaucracy). The purchase of these arms, however, enables them to prey on other
agents in the economy. Alternatively, one can think of this in terms of the costs of
purchasing political power and influence. Political markets in the real world
involve significant transaction costs of lobbying, obtaining exemptions, and large
fixed costs of political organization (Downs, 1957; and Huntington, 1968). In this
interpretation, wealthy agents or the elites can then use their political power to
extract rents from the most productive sectors and to influence government deci-
sions that are favorable to their interests.
The assumption of increasing returns in rent seeking or political influence is
consistent with historical evidence. In Republican Rome and in 17th century
France, an important prerequisite for engaging in tax farming was the availability
of sufficient capital that enabled wealthy individuals to advance funds to rulers and
to collect taxes (Braudel, 1982; and Levi, 1989). Baumol (1990) notes that in
Mandarin China and in medieval Europe, government service—with its potential
2See Benabou (1997) for a survey on the inverse relationship between inequality and growth.Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris
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for illegal personal enrichment—was the principal career choice for many wealthy
individuals. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) provide numerous historical examples
in which a small wealthy class was able to capture the state. Wealth requirements
for voting and differences in the distribution of political power in colonial Latin
America are widely perceived as affecting access to economic opportunities in
ways that, in turn, have influenced long-term institutional development and per-
petuated inequality (de Ferranti and others, 2003).
Wade (1985) found that individuals in India paid thousands of dollars for posi-
tions with the power to allocate supposedly free water to farmers, since these jobs
gave them monopoly rights to charge for water. In many developing countries,
civil service positions are purchased at high prices compared with the annual salary
for the position. Casual observation suggests that in many countries it is common
for government officials and politicians to own businesses run by either them-
selves or their relatives, and to protect such businesses from corrupt practices and
other forms of expropriation by virtue of their positions. The association between
wealth and rent seeking in the presence of poor property rights protection is also
receiving increasing attention in Eastern Europe’s transition to capitalism, partic-
ularly in the context of privatization (Sonin, 2003; and Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004).
This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect capital
markets and a nonconvex rent-seeking technology. Agents in this model have iden-
tical preferences and abilities and differ only with respect to their initial income.We
assume that agents can operate in one of two sectors in the economy: rent seeking
and production. Entry into rent seeking requires the payment of a fixed cost.
Payment of this cost allows rent seekers to appropriate some portion of the surplus
generated by productive economic activity and to save a desired portion of their ini-
tial income (through hoarding), thereby protecting their wealth from expropriation
by others. We show that for a certain range of parameter values there is a unique
interior equilibrium with rent seeking, which depends on the initial distribution of
wealth in society.
In an extension, we introduce heterogeneity in productive ability. This intro-
duces a trade-off, since wealthier agents can choose to become producers even
though they can afford the costs of rent seeking. We show that rent seeking in such
an economy typically involves lower social costs, but the main implications of our
basic model generalize.
This paper is related to several strands of research. The role of investment indi-
visibilities and credit market imperfections in explaining the relationship between
inequality and economic development has been studied by Galor and Zeira (1993)
and Banerjee and Newman (1993), among others. Another literature explicitly
examines the associations among wealth, political power, and redistribution. Verdier
(1996) and Rodriguez (1999) assume fixed costs in political participation to gener-
ate increasing returns and the separation of the rich and poor in terms of political
influence. Specifically, Verdier shows how the wealthy influence the direction of
income transfers in society and highlights the role of the initial distribution of
wealth in determining this pattern. In this respect, our analysis of rent seeking by
the rich in the presence of insecure property rights can be viewed as complemen-
tary to his.RENT SEEKING
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Our paper is closely related to economic models of rent seeking and economic
development. In Baumol (1990); Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993); Acemoglu
(1995); Baland and Francois (2000); and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2003), for
example, individuals choose between productive and rent-seeking activities by
comparing their relative rewards. These rewards are, in turn, determined by the
allocation of individuals between the two activities. Our paper extends the litera-
ture by providing an explanation for the observed association between wealth and
rent seeking.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on conflict. Grossman (1991,
1994) shows how inequality induces the poor to engage in predatory activities
and the rich in investments in defense, diverting resources from productive activ-
ities. Skaperdas (1992) argues that the more productive groups of individuals
may have a comparative disadvantage in the process of appropriative competi-
tion. The view proposed in this paper is that in the absence of adequate property
rights protection, it is the rich who are likely to benefit from appropriation.
Grossman and Kim (1997) assume that weapons are used either for predation or
for defensive fortifications. In contrast, this paper views predation and the deter-
rence of predation as complementary activities.
I. Model
Environment and Technology
Consider an economy comprised of a continuum of two-period-lived agents dis-
tributed over the interval [0,1]. Each agent is endowed with w > 0 units of the con-
sumption good when young. The initial distribution of goods endowment in the
economy is represented by the cumulative distribution function Γ:[w, w
_
] → [0,1].
Agents are risk neutral and have identical preferences and abilities. They differ only
in initial income. The lifetime expected utility of an agent is given by U(c1, c2) = c1
+ E(c ~
2), where E is the expectations operator and c1 and c ~
2 denote consumption of
the economy’s single good in each period of life. Second-period consumption is
uncertain, because it depends on the degree of rent seeking in the economy.
Each producer has access to a standard concave production technology that
yields f(i) units of the consumption good in period 2 of the producer’s life from an
investment of i units in period 1, where f(0) = 0 and f′(0) =∞ . Producers, however,
face appropriation of some share of their market production by rent seekers. There
is no law enforcement (we briefly discuss law enforcement in Section II) and no
government taxation.
Let 0 < γ < 1 denote the exogenously given proportion of market production
that can be extracted from each producer. The idea here is that in the absence of
adequate enforcement, producers do not possess complete property rights over
their output. We can, therefore, think of γ as the profit loss due to taxes, bribes,
outright expropriation, or, more generally, as the cost of doing business in a rent-
seeking society. In reality, this fraction may be an endogenous function of the level
of economic development, the effectiveness of law enforcement, or the efficiency
of the institutional background of the economy.Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris
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The description of the rent-seeking sector is similar to that in Mehlum,
Moene, and Torvik (2003). Let πP denote the probability of being approached by
a rent seeker. The second-period expected return to a producer is then given by 
(1 −π P γ)f(i). Let n denote the mass (fraction) of rent seekers in the economy. Each
rent seeker can expropriate a share γ of the production of λ≥1 producers in the
economy. This assumption implies that a rent seeker can expropriate from more
than one producer. However, each producer is only approached by a single rent
seeker.3 The probability πP can then be defined as the ratio of the total number of
rent-seeking cases in the economy divided by the mass of producers, (1 − n).
Assuming full information, πP can be defined as
Entry into rent seeking requires a fixed cost of θ units of the consumption
good when young. Payment of this cost allows rent seekers to tax market produc-
tion in the second period of their lives. This assumption is vital to the results below
and captures increasing returns to rent seeking. Because of capital market imper-
fections, agents are unable to borrow to finance entry into rent seeking using their
future income as collateral. Therefore, in order to belong to the class of rent seek-
ers, an agent must have a starting level of wealth w ≥θ .
Rent seekers save through a simple technology that returns xs units of goods
in period 2 of their lives for an investment of s units when young. The inputs of
rent seekers are assumed to be unobservable, which implies that one rent seeker
cannot expropriate the goods controlled by another. Therefore, one may think of x
as the return on hoarding that allows rent seekers protection from theft by others.
The net return from hoarding is low but positive, that is, x > 1.4
The probability πR that a particular rent seeker is the first to approach a producer
is defined by the ratio of the total mass of producers, (1 − n), divided by the total
rent-seeking cases in the economy, λn. This probability can be expressed as follows:
The ratio (1 − n)/λn also captures congestion in rent-seeking activity. When
(1 − n) > λn (i.e., when the fraction of producers in the economy exceeds total
rent-seeking cases), there is no crowding out among rent seekers, with probability
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3A producer never gets approached by more than one rent seeker here. One interpretation of this
assumption is that each rent seeker implicitly provides protection against extortion by others, as in
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2003). In our model, each rent seeker can extract rent from more than one
producer, but we abstract from the issue of protection.
4As we note below, f′(i) > x in a positive rent-seeking equilibrium when γ is high. In this case, rent
seeking competes with productive sectors for resources, resulting in further misallocation of resources in
the economy.RENT SEEKING
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rent-seeking cases in the economy than there are producers, each rent seeker can
capture the full potential rent given by the rent-seeking technology from the λ pro-
ducers approached. However, when λn > (1 − n), crowding out occurs, since each
rent seeker competes with others for rents and the expected rent to each falls.
Let ñ denote the value of n for which the total fraction of rent-seeking cases
in the economy equals the fraction of producers. The probability πP that a pro-
ducer is approached by a rent seeker can then be expressed as
and the probability πR that a rent seeker expropriates from a producer as
Notice that 
Occupational Choice
The timing of the model is as follows. In the first period of their lives, individuals
choose their occupation (production or rent seeking) and consume. At the begin-
ning of the second period of their lives, there is a matching process between rent
seekers and productive agents. Once that process resolves, individuals consume.
First, consider the optimization problem faced by an agent who chooses to
become a producer. The budget constraints faced by a producer in each period of
life are
where πP is the probability of being approached by a rent seeker from equation (3).
The producer maximizes expected utility, given an initial endowment w:
The first-order condition is given by
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where 0 ≤γ π P < 1. For a positive probability of theft, the marginal return from
investment exceeds 1: f′(i) = 1/(1 −γπ P) > 1. If γ and πP are significantly high, the
marginal return from production also dominates the marginal return from hoard-
ing, that is, f′(i) > x.
Let i* = i(γπP) denote the optimal investment choice that satisfies equation (5).
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to γπP shows that investment is decreas-
ing in rent seeking because it lowers the expected return from investment.5 Note
also that i* is the same for all producers and is independent of a producer’s initial
wealth.6
The indirect utility from being a producer can then be written as
the last term being positive for optimal investment choice.
We turn next to the rent seeker’s problem. Each rent seeker can expropriate a
γ fraction of a producer’s second-period income. We assume random matching
between rent seekers and producers. Since all producers, irrespective of their ini-
tial endowment, earn the same income in the second period, the potential rent that
can be appropriated from a producer is the same no matter which producer the rent
seeker steals from. However, we later allow for heterogeneous income across pro-
ducers (Section III). To simplify our future analysis, we assume that endowments
are not ex ante observable; they are observed by rent seekers only when they
attempt to expropriate producers’ incomes. Hence, decisions about rent seeking
are based on the expected rent that can be earned from a successful match with a
producer, which is given by
where w* (to be endogenously determined) is the cutoff level of wealth, w, for which
agents choose to be producers. Since i* is independent of wealth, this simplifies to








































PP =+ − () () − [] 16 γπ ** ,( )
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6This follows from our assumption of linear utility. Allowing for risk aversion does not fundamentally
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where πR is the probability of being the first to approach a producer (equation (4)),
s represents the savings of the rent seeker, θ denotes the up-front fixed cost to rent
seeking, and R (given in equation (7)) is the expected amount expropriated from a
producer. The rent seeker maximizes expected utility, given an initial endowment w:
The assumption that the gross return on hoarding exceeds 1 implies that a rent
seeker will save the entire first-period income and consume only in the second
period, that is,
The indirect utility from being a rent seeker is then given by
which, in equilibrium using equation (7), can be rewritten as
An individual chooses an occupation depending on which one generates
higher lifetime utility. Let Ω(w) denote the difference between lifetime utility of
an agent with endowment w if the agent engages in rent seeking and utility upon
becoming a producer:
The individual will choose to be a rent seeker if Ω > 0. Differentiating Ω with
respect to w and using x > 1 shows that the net utility from being a rent seeker is
strictly increasing in the agent’s wealth (see Figure 1).
Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that an individual’s initial wealth determines occupa-
tional choice between rent seeking and production. Let w* denote the threshold
level of wealth such that Ω > 0 for w > w*, and n* denote the equilibrium alloca-
tion of agents between rent seeking and production, such that
An equilibrium in this environment is defined by a cutoff wealth level, w*, and
a number of rent seekers, n*, such that agents with wealth w* are indifferent
between production and rent seeking (i.e., VR(w*, n*) = VP(w*, n*), i*(n*) =
i(γπP(n*)) from equation (5), and equations (3), (4), and (11) hold.
nd w w
w
w * * .( ) * = () =−() ∫ ΓΓ 11 1
Ω =−= − () + () −− () +− () ( VV x w f i wi f i
RP R P θλ π γ γ π ** * 1 ) ) [] .( ) 10
Vx w f i
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We illustrate the general equilibrium using a diagram in (n*, w*) in Figures 2
and 3. Since an agent with wealth w* is indifferent between the two occupations,
the net utility from rent seeking is
given n*.
Note that as the fraction of producers in the economy decreases and the fraction
of rent seekers increases, production declines but rents accruing to each rent seeker
depend on whether or not crowding out sets in. For n < ñ, the fraction of producers
in the economy exceeds total rent-seeking cases: There is no crowding out among
rent seekers (πR = 1), but producers face expropriation of their production with
increasing probability (πP =λ n/(1 − n)), thereby decreasing the return to production.
Using equations (3) and (4) and simplifying, equation (12) can be written as
Ω(w*, n*) is increasing in w* and n*. Hence, as illustrated in Figure 2, the zero
net utility curve is downward sloping in (n*, w*) space for the range n ≤ ñ.
Ω wn wx x i
n
fi *, ** *
*









0 01 3 .( )
Ω wn x w n fi
wi
R *, ** * *
**




P P nf i **,( ) () ( ) () [] = 01 2
Figure 1. Occupational Choice
θ
RR






Producer Rent seeker RENT SEEKING
37
With n > ñ, the probability of being approached by a rent seeker becomes 1
(πP = 1), while the probability that a rent seeker can expropriate from producers
starts to decline as rent seekers begin to crowd each other out (πR = (1 − n)/λn).
Equation (12) now becomes
In this case, Ω(w*, n*) is increasing in w* but decreasing in n*. This means, for
n > ñ, the zero net utility curve is upward sloping as in Figure 2.
Consider now the case where there is no rent seeking (n = 0).7At n = 0, equa-
tion (4) suggests that πR = 1 and the first rent seeker to approach producers can
capture λγf(i*) in rents, while πP = 0. Let wC denote the value of w that satisfies






−+− () () []
1
1
1 θλ γ ** .
Ω wn wx x i
n
fi *, ** *
*




  () = 11 0 θ
γ
1 14)
7It is easy to see that an equilibrium in which all agents engage in rent seeking does not exist. With
n = 1, πR = 0 as rent seekers crowd each other out, while πP = 1. As a result, the rent accruing to each rent
seeker is zero. Moreover, marginal returns from production f′(0) will dominate marginal returns from pro-
tected investment x.
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For wC < w
_
, as illustrated in Figure 2, the Ω(w, n) = 0 curve intersects the 
n = 1 −Γ (w) line once at the unique rent-seeking equilibrium with n* > 0.8 A suf-
ficiently low θ or sufficiently high λ and γ make this equilibrium more likely.
Intuitively, when costs of entering into rent seeking are low or the amount that can
be expropriated is high, a career in rent seeking will be relatively more attractive
compared with production. If λ is sufficiently greater than 1 such that each rent
seeker can expropriate from a large number of producers, ñ and, therefore, n*
would be lower than 0.5. This would correspond to the historical evidence of a small
rent-seeking elite expropriating from a large segment of society (see Engerman and
Sokoloff, 2002, for examples).
It is also possible that wC > w
_
at n = 0. If, for instance, the cost of entering into
rent seeking, θ, is high relative to the expected return from expropriation (deter-
mined by λγ), we can get multiple equilibria in rent seeking and production. This
case is illustrated in Figure 3, where the Ω(w, n) = 0 curve intersects the n = 1 −
Γ(w) line twice. One equilibrium corresponds to the case of positive levels of rent
seeking with n* > ñ. A second equilibrium is one with no rent seeking (n = 0).
A third equilibrium also exists in Figure 3 with a positive level of rent seek-
ing and production where Ω(w*, n*) = 0. But such an equilibrium is unstable,
8It is also possible for n* to be less than ñ in Figure 2.
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since a small change in n and w from their equilibrium values drives the economy
to one of the two stable equilibria (with positive or zero rent seeking).
We  summarize this discussion in the following two propositions (technical
details are provided in the appendix).
Proposition 1. When the cost of rent seeking is low relative to expected
returns (that is, wC > w
_
), a unique equilibrium exists with a positive measure of
agents engaged in rent seeking and production. When costs of rent seeking are rel-
atively high (wC < w
_
), a corner equilibrium with zero rent seeking definitely exists.
In addition, an interior equilibrium with positive rent seeking may exist.
Now consider an equilibrium with positive rent seeking. As the discussion
above makes clear, it is the relatively wealthy who engage in rent-seeking activi-
ties in such an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the greater the initial wealth of an agent, the
more attractive a career in rent seeking relative to production.
Proposition 2 states that the rich become rent seekers. But it is not higher
wealth alone that creates incentives for wealthy agents to enter into rent seeking.
The ability to protect their wealth from expropriation by others (the slope of VR
is simply x) also plays a key role.9 In the absence of credit markets, a higher ini-
tial wealth is of greater value to rent seekers than to producers, because it allows
them to devote a larger amount of their endowment to hoarding once θ is paid.
Specifically, the existence of a protection technology against expropriation by
others implies that wealthier agents endure a smaller lifetime utility sacrifice in
paying the fixed cost for rent seeking and hoarding, and hence are more willing to
enter into this occupation. Therefore, in the presence of the rent-seeking fixed cost,
θ, and in the absence of credit markets, only relatively wealthy agents choose to
become rent seekers.
This result extends to alternative formulations of capital market imperfections
or the rent-seeking technology. All that is needed is that the marginal benefit of
entering into rent seeking is higher for wealthier individuals. Thus, despite the fact
that agents are ex ante identical in terms of preferences and abilities, two classes of
agents emerge in equilibrium. It is the initial income (w) of an agent that determines
the agent’s decision to engage in rent seeking or production, and how much to con-
sume and save. Hence, the initial distribution of endowments determines aggregate
output in the economy and the measure of agents engaged in rent seeking.
Note that the weaker property right protection is (that is, the higher γ), the
more attractive rent seeking becomes as a profession and the less attractive pro-
duction becomes. In Figure 3, the effect of a higher γ is to shift down the net util-
ity curve, resulting in more agents switching to rent seeking (lower w*, higher n*).
When hoarding has a lower marginal product than marketed production (x <
f′(i*)), the greater the proportion of rent seekers, and the smaller the aggregate
output. Hence, the total output in the economy is negatively related to the size of
the rent-seeking sector. Net output—that is, aggregate output net of rent-seeking
costs (deadweight losses)—is even lower.
9This slope will also depend on wealth if, for example, rents expropriated depend on the rent seeker’s
own wealth, as in Sonin (2003).Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris
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II. Key Assumptions
Having analyzed the equilibrium of this model, we now briefly discuss the assump-
tions underlying the model and how changes in parameter values affect equilib-
rium outcomes. The results of the model are robust to alternative specifications of
the rent-seeking technology. In our model, returns to rent seeking, past the fixed
cost θ, are not sensitive to the amounts invested. Alternatively, returns to rent seek-
ing could be related to the amounts invested in such activities. Allowing rent seek-
ers to expropriate a fixed proportion of producers’ output simplifies our analysis
but does not affect any of the major results.
The model also assumes a specific form for the function that relates the
amount of rent obtained by each rent seeker from expropriation to the proportion
of rent seekers in the economy. This assumption implies that the amount expro-
priated by each rent seeker is decreasing in n because of increased competition
among rent seekers. This extreme form of crowding out, again, is not crucial for
the results of this model.
In the model, agents are assumed to be unable to finance their entry into rent
seeking through borrowing. Credit markets in many developing countries are typ-
ically characterized by high collateral requirements. An agent seeking to obtain a
loan to finance the entrance fee into rent seeking would need to have substantial
capital to meet the collateral requirements. This suggests that even in the presence
of credit markets it is the relatively wealthy who will be able to obtain such loans.
The model also abstracts from law enforcement as the rent seekers’probability
of being caught and punished is implicitly set equal to zero. Clearly, effective law
enforcement would reduce the attractiveness of rent seeking. Law enforcement can
easily be captured in the model by making γ a decreasing function of the economy-
wide resources devoted to enforcement. If, for instance, such enforcement is
financed through a lump sum tax on producers, the larger the size of the rent-
seeking sector, the larger the tax required to finance a given level of enforcement
would be. As a result, even with positive law enforcement, the implied trade-off for
producers between lower expropriation and higher taxes suggests that rent seeking
will not be eliminated in equilibrium.
Our results require two crucial assumptions: (1) that there are indivisibilities in
rent seeking and (2) that rent seekers have access to a “protection” technology. The
assumption of indivisibilities in rent seeking is vital to the results of the paper, as it
captures the increasing returns necessary to generate a split between the poor and
rich in terms of rent seeking. These assumptions together ensure that the distribu-
tion of initial income determines the choice between rent seeking and production.
III. Extensions
In the environment above, fixed costs of rent seeking confer to wealthier agents a
comparative advantage in rent seeking. It is not surprising, then, that wealthier
agents substitute away from production in a rent-seeking equilibrium.
But wealth is not the sole determinant of production possibilities in general.
In particular, an individual’s productivity as a producer could depend on innateRENT SEEKING
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abilities that are unrelated to income or wealth. In this section, we consider an
extension in which individuals differ in two ways: (1) their initial endowment
(wealth) and (2) their ability as producers.10
Specifically, suppose an individual of ability a is able to produce af(i) units of
the final consumption good from an investment i. We posit that ability is uncorre-
lated with wealth. As before, the initial endowment is distributed according to the
cumulative distribution function Γ(w) on the [w, w
_
]. An individual’s ability is drawn
independently from a cumulative distribution function G(a) defined over [a, a
_
].
The absence of correlation between wealth and ability introduces an interesting
trade-off in occupational choices. Wealth will no longer be the sole determinant of
occupational choice, as wealthier individuals may have a comparative advantage
in production.
Consider the optimization problem facing a producer of ability a and wealth w.
He chooses investment to maximize expected lifetime utility
facing similar budget constraints as before. The first-order condition for investment
choice, 1 = (1 −γπ P)af′(i), gives the investment function
which is increasing in the first argument as expected and decreasing in the second
as before. Substituting these into the lifetime utility function gives a producer’s
indirect utility as
where the term inside the brackets is positive given optimal investment choice and
concavity of the production function.
Nothing changes in the rent seeker’s optimization problem. He maximizes
expected lifetime utility as before, taking as given the rent R that he expects to get
from a successful random match with a producer. The indirect utility function is then
as before, though rent R will be different in equilibrium.
Vx w R
RR =− () + θπ,( ) 17
Vw a f i ai a
PP =+ − ( ) () () − () [] 11 6 γπ ** ,( )
ii a
P * ,, ( ) = () γπ 15
Uw i a f i
PP =− +− ( ) () 1 γπ
10One interpretation of the basic model is that differences in endowments are due to differences in first-
period abilities as producers. More able agents are wealthier in period 1 as a result. Subsequent to first-
period production, agents face an investment choice between a productive asset (which yields f(i) from
investment i) and a low-productive one (with a fixed cost θ paid up front but a low return x in period 2, plus,
possibly, rent-seeking opportunities). The productivity of this investment does not depend on first-period
abilities. In this scenario, more able (and wealthier) individuals will prefer the low-productivity asset, result-
ing in smaller net output. This interpretation of the model is similar to the result of Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1993) and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) that rent seeking is particularly costly because talented
individuals spend time rent seeking instead of in more productive occupations.Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris
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Consider now the occupational choice facing an individual with ability a and
wealth w ≥θ . The net utility that the individual enjoys from being a rent seeker is
which is increasing in wealth but decreasing in ability. Intuitively, the higher a per-
son’s productive ability, the more income that person can enjoy as a producer;
while the higher the wealth, the easier it is to afford the cost of rent seeking.
But a high-wealth individual now finds rent seeking more attractive only if the
individual’s ability is low enough. To see this, consider Figure 4, which illustrates
the indirect utility functions corresponding to ability levels a and a′(> a). Since the
higher-ability individual generates higher output, VP(w, a′) lies uniformly above
VP(w, a), the intercept gap capturing the differential productivity effect. As the
diagram indicates, the lower-ability individual is willing to switch to rent seeking
for a lower wealth level w*(a) than the higher-ability individual. Intuitively, wealth
confers a comparative advantage in rent seeking, while ability confers a compara-
tive advantage in production. Wealthy individuals of low ability, therefore, find
rent seeking a more attractive occupation.
To formalize this intuition, note that an individual with wealth w ≥θbecomes a
rent seeker only if Ω(w, a) ≥ 0, taking as given rents R and the number of agents in
rent seeking n. Since Ω is a continuously differentiable increasing function of wealth
and decreasing function of ability, we can rewrite this as a ≤ h(w) with h′ > 0.
Ω wa V V x w x R a f i a
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This means that the agent chooses to be a rent seeker only if the agent’s ability
as a producer is “low enough,” that is, a ≤ h(w). This is true of any wealth level
exceeding the minimum amount required to finance the rent-seeking operation.
Thus, the measure of individuals corresponding to any wealth w ≥θwho become 
rent seekers is 
Now consider the lowest ability individual, a, who has the most incentive to
become a rent seeker as long as it is affordable. To do so, wealth has to be high
enough relative to ability so that it adequately compensates for the fixed costs of
rent seeking, that is,
Hence, as Figure 5 illustrates, the measure of individuals in the entire population
who choose rent seeking over production is simply
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Finally, consider the rents that a rent seeker can expect to appropriate when
successfully (but randomly) matched with a producer. Given the occupational
choices above, this is given by
Since the expression for expected rents does not simplify any further, it is not
easy solving for the general equilibrium of this model, even with linear utility and
simple distribution functions. The intuition behind an interior rent-seeking equilib-
rium presented in the previous sections is, however, general. Given the differentia-
bility and continuity of the utility and distribution functions, such an equilibrium
will exist in this model. It will be defined by a threshold value w*, the ability func-
tion h(w), number of rent seekers n, and expected rents R that satisfy equations (15),
(19), (20), and (21).
Corner equilibrium (n = 0, R = 0) with no rent seeking is also possible. In
such an equilibrium, the net utility for an agent who is considering deviating to
rent seeking is
where i(a, 0) denotes optimal investment corresponding to ability a and zero rent
seeking. We already know that the individual who faces the highest incentive to be
a rent seeker is the one with highest wealth w
_
and lowest ability a. Hence, for no




, this is more likely the higher the productivity of the lowest ability
type (a), the lower the return from hoarding (x), the higher the costs of becoming
a rent seeker (θ), and the lower the productivity of rent seeking (γ, λ). As long as
the condition above is satisfied, the economy will admit multiple levels of rent
seeking as equilibrium outcomes. Typically, two stable equilibria with zero and
positive rent seeking will result, as in Figure 3.
Focusing on the interior equilibrium, one implication of this extended model
is obvious: The initial distribution is not the only determinant of rent seeking; it
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depends also on the productivity of agents and the extent to which wealth and pro-
ductivity are correlated.
Second, the model implies that costs of rent seeking in the previous model are
exaggerated, since it “overstates” the incentives wealthier agents face to become
rent seekers. At one extreme, if wealth and ability were perfectly correlated (for
instance, because wealthier individuals could afford better education in period 1,
which made them more productive in period 2), it is quite possible for rent seek-
ing to disappear, in equilibrium; for example, if the education technology were
highly productive.
In general though, innate ability (uncorrelated with wealth) also determines an
individual’s production possibilities. In the case analyzed above, positive rent seek-
ing occurs in equilibrium. But the social costs of rent seeking are lower than before:
First, a smaller fraction of the population with wealth exceeding θ become rent
seekers, so the deadweight loss is lower, and second, these low-ability rent seekers
do not cost aggregate output as much, since their comparative advantage does not
lie in production.
The dynamic implications of our model are interesting. Think of the two-period
model as a snapshot of a two-period, overlapping-generations economy in which
successive generations are interlinked via wealth transfers (bequests). Assuming
that wealthier parents transfer more to their offspring, our basic model with homo-
geneous abilities implies that persistent dynastic occupational choices are possible,
as children of rent-seeking wealthy parents choose their parents’occupations.
If we allow for ability differences, too, and if intergenerational abilities are not
(or weakly) correlated, that is no longer the case. Over time, we will observe dynas-
tic mobility between the two occupations: As some producer dynasties become
wealthier as a result of high abilities, there will be a tendency for their low-ability
wealthy offspring to engage in rent seeking; and vice versa for dynasties that begin
as rent seekers.
Finally, consider whether government policies can mitigate the effect of
inequality on rent seeking via redistribution (assuming the government can
observe endowments even though private agents cannot). Our model, whether
ability is homogeneous or heterogeneous, implies that taxing the rich will raise
their average cost for rent seeking, shifting them into production. But redistribut-
ing these tax revenues to the poor may be counterproductive if posttax endow-
ments exceed θ, since it raises the incentive of the poor to engage in rent seeking.
A better policy would be to use the tax revenues to subsidize production directly,
which raises the return on investment for all.
Moreover, if the economy admits multiple rent-seeking equilibria (Figure 3),
a temporary redistributive policy may have permanent effects if it is progressive
enough. Taxing wealthier agents at a higher rate can significantly lower their net
returns from rent seeking, so that rent seeking disappears in equilibrium. Since
multiple equilibria result in this model from a coordination problem,11 once the
11If all agents could coordinate a simultaneous move to production, the threat of expropriation would
disappear, since there would be no rent seekers, and production would yield higher utility even to the
wealthiest individuals.Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris
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economy moves away from rent seeking, lifting the redistributive tax schedule
need not push the economy back to rent seeking as long as agents expect zero rent
seeking in the future.
IV. Conclusion
This paper presents a simple economic model of rent seeking to examine the rela-
tionships among income distribution, rent-seeking behavior, and economic perfor-
mance when the government cannot enforce property rights. We show that in the
absence of credit markets only wealthy agents can overcome the nonconvexity in
rent seeking. The wealthy are, therefore, “born into rent seeking.” We analyze a
model in which rent seeking not only enables agents to extract some portion of the
proceeds from market production but also ensures protection of their wealth from
appropriation by others. Therefore, wealthy agents avoid the tax from rent seekers
by becoming rent seekers themselves, a result that accords well with both histori-
cal evidence and casual observation in developing countries.
The model implies that, in the absence of property rights protection, societies
that have a more unequal distribution of wealth and are characterized by a small
fraction of people who can afford entry into rent seeking will be the societies with
greater social polarization and entrenched rent seeking by a few at the expense of
the majority. At the other extreme, the model suggests that societies in which prop-
erty rights are better enforced (for example, if γ is very low) will experience less
polarization and higher economic performance.
We extended the model to analyze the robustness of our results when agents
also differ in their ability as producers. Heterogeneous ability and wealth intro-
duce a trade-off—agents specialize in rent seeking or production depending on
where their comparative advantage lies. Since wealthier, but able, agents can pre-
fer production over rent seeking, the rent-seeking equilibrium now involves lower
social costs than when individuals have identical abilities.
Our model also has implications for redistribution and public education poli-
cies. Irrespective of whether ability is homogeneous or heterogeneous, our model
implies that taxing the rich will raise their average cost for rent seeking, shifting
them into production. However, simply redistributing these tax revenues to the
poor may be counterproductive if it raises their posttax endowments and their
incentive to engage in rent seeking. A better policy would be to use the tax rev-
enues to target education resources to the poor, particularly if wealth and abili-
ties are uncorrelated. If, on the other hand, wealth and abilities are perfectly
correlated, it may be possible for the rent-seeking equilibrium to disappear if,
for example, the education technology is highly productive. One policy conclu-
sion that naturally arises from this case is that it may be worth targeting higher
education to the rich to eliminate rent seeking. However, Dabla-Norris and
Gradstein (2004) show that in societies with weak rule of law, the rich are more
effective in appropriating a larger share of public education spending, thereby
preventing the reduction of inequality. Therefore, overall incentives to engage in
rent seeking may not be eliminated as long as the rich can also engage in rent
seeking over public education funds. More generally, our model suggests thatRENT SEEKING
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improving access to high-quality education would raise the returns to production
directly for all.
The model presented is essentially static in nature in that it describes the short-
run equilibrium effect of the distribution of income on the decision to enter into
rent-seeking activities. An important extension would be to consider the dynamics
of the relationship between income distribution and rent seeking as an economy
develops. Such an extension would allow us to analyze how the distribution of
wealth can, in turn, be determined by the size of the rent-seeking sector and to
explain the persistence of rent seeking and inequality in societies.
Another extension we plan to pursue in future work is the possibility for pro-
ducers to invest in defending their output from appropriation. Such investment
could be entirely private or, more interestingly, publicly funded out of taxes. This
will provide a backdrop to study the endogenous evolution of property rights and
how it changes with economic development and wealth accumulation. To do so,
we need to move beyond our static framework with risk-neutral agents so that
dynamic choices depend more meaningfully on the evolution of wealth and pro-
duction possibilities.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
Rewrite equation (11) as w =Γ −1(1  − n)  ≡Φ (n), where Φ is monotonically decreasing.
Similarly, from equations (13) and (14),
which is nonmonotonic and, in particular, U-shaped, as shown in the text. The optimal invest-
ment level i* solves  f′(i) = 1 for n ≤ ñ, and (1 −γ )f′(i) = 1 otherwise. Equilibrium
level of rent seeking n* solves Z(n*) ≡Φ (n*) −Ψ (n*) = 0. Once n* is known, the equilibrium
w* can be determined via Φ or Ψ.
First, consider the case when wC < w
_
. Here Φ(0) = w
_
, Φ(1) = w, Ψ(0) = wC, Ψ(1) > w.
Hence, Z(0) > 0 and Z(1) < 0. By the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT), since Z(n) is contin-
uous on [0, 1] there exists at least one n* ∈ [0, 1] such that Z(n*) = 0. In fact, by appealing to
the U shape of Ψ, we know this equilibrium is unique.
When wC ≥ w
_
, on the other hand, let nC ≥ 0 such that Ψ(nC) = w
_
. Now we have Z(0) = 0,
Z(nC) < 0, Z(1) < 0. Note that, as before, there exists n* = 0 such that Z(n*) = 0. Zero rent seek-
ing is evidently an equilibrium in this case. In addition, other equilibria with positive rent seek-
ing can also exist, since Z is nonmonotonic. For instance, since Ψ is U-shaped, it is possible
that Ψ(ñ) < Φ(ñ), in which case Z(ñ) > 0. By the IVT, we should have an intermediate n′∈(0,
ñ) such that Z(n′) = 0 and another n** ∈ (ñ, 1) such that Z(n**) = 0. But only n** is an equi-
librium in the model, since n′ is unstable (slight deviations in n will cause individuals to move
toward zero or n**). In other words, a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique interior
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Proof of Proposition 2
The differential equilibrium utility of any agent with wealth w ≥ w*, given equilibrium level of
rent seeking n*, is
Evidently, ∂Ω/∂w = x − 1 > 0. In other words, as long as individuals can afford the fixed cost of
rent seeking (w ≥ w*), net utility from rent seeking over production increases in initial wealth w.
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